By 1810 Napoleon had established an empire in Europe that surpassed that of Charlemagne a millennium before. Nevertheless in a couple of years it would collapse. The following articles will trace the events that led to its fall throughout the climactic years 1813-1815, in which, among a number of other battles, were fought 2 of the foremost decisive in history i.e. Waterloo and Leipzig. Leipzig, the largest battle in history till 1914, called as the 'Battle of the Nations' because of its sheer size and also the number of nationalities took part. Half a million men struggled during a clash of arms that was to determine whether Napoleon would still maintain his empire in central Europe. What might, except for the extraordinary error on the part of one sergeant of engineers, have been a drawn battle became a disaster that forced Napoleon and his crushed army to abandon Germany and withdraw across the Rhine, thus bringing the war again to French soil for the first time in more than twenty years. The campaign of 1814 which followed taxed Napoleon to the limit, and yet, with paltry forces - some mere boys – he displayed a number of his former strategic and tactical genius and cause a number of defeats on the Allies before surrender to force of numbers and the betrayal of his marshals.
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| Napoleon and his desperate men lead the army throughout mud and snow during the campaign of 1814 in France. In spite of the huge losses sustained by the Grande Armée the previous year Napoleon steadfastly clung to his conviction that he might ultimately achieve victory, a belief underlined by Napoleon’s apparently callous indifference to losses.’ I grew up upon the field of battle,' Napoleon declared a few months before, 'and a man such as I care little for the lives of a million men.' |
The seeds of destruction were sown throughout the Russian campaign in 1812, after that, despite having lost over 500,000 men, Napoleon prepared for a new campaign in the coming spring. The Russians, encouraged by Napoleon's retreat, were prepared to carry the war that will be called as the War of the Sixth Coalition, into Germany, with Prussia as a junior partner in a new alliance.
That this alliance had been preceded by 5 others provides a good indication of the Great Powers' failure to curb French expansion since the beginning of the wars twenty years earlier. However for Prussia and for a number of other German states, this new struggle was to have an ideological element that had been missing from her 1806-1807 war: the campaign of 1813 was to become known by its patriotic title: the 'War of German Liberation'. The moral forces which had once given impetus to the armies of revolutionary France were currently coming back to haunt them, though with some adaptations. The Prussians had no desire for a republic, however their nationalism had been awakened, and therefore the war was to be for the liberation of 'Germany', more than fifty years before an actual nation state with this name emerged.
At this stage, the coalition failed to contain all the Great Powers, however unity was crucial for success. Some nations, like Sweden and Austria, wished to wait and observe how the tide of fortune moved, however eventually they and most of the former members of the Confederation of the Rhine, including Saxony and Bavaria, would side with the Allies in numbers which Napoleon might never hope to match. Britain, too, would play a significant financial and diplomatic role in the war, ensuring Allied unity and providing millions of pounds in subsidies to nations that could supply the manpower needed. Britain had committed tens of thousands of men to the ongoing struggle in Spain, and continued to man the fleets that blockaded French ports and starved Napoleon's empire of seaborne trade.
Yet Napoleon wasn't to be overwhelmed by circumstances that lesser commanders might have considered hopeless. Quickly raising new armies composed of young, inexperienced conscripts and invalided veterans, however seriously deficient in competent non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and trained officers, and with a serious shortage of cavalry, Napoleon resolved to preserve his empire in Germany, despite the rapidly spawning forces of nationalism. The Emperor's organizational genius resurrected a new army with which he achieved hard-fought victories at Bautzen and Lützen before, in late summer, Austria finally threw in her lot with the Allies, thereby making the most formidable military alliance Europe had ever seen and the combination of Great Powers that was absolutely vital if Europe was to free itself of Napoleon's control.
Further epic struggles were to follow during the autumn campaign, including the battles of Leipzig and Dresden. When operations shifted to French soil in 1814, the beleaguered Emperor found himself outnumbered by over than three to one, nevertheless in a series of brilliant actions he managed to hold the Allies at bay, displaying a military genius reminiscent of Napoleon’s earlier years. But, with Paris threatened, Napoleon’s army overwhelmed by very greater numbers, and Napoleon’s marshals refusing to fight on, Napoleon was ultimately forced to give up, only to return the following year to fight his last, and history's greatest, battle.
Waterloo was more than a battle with far-reaching political effects: it was a human drama possibly unparalleled in military history, and it is no accident that far more has been written about this 8 hours period of time than any other in history. The defense of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, the charge of the Scots Greys, Wellington's committed infantry defying the assault of the cuirassiers, the struggle for Plancenoit, and the repulse of the Imperial Guard – all became compelling and distinct episodes in a battle on which hinged nothing less than the future of European security. When it was all over, the Allies could at last implement their historic and extensive plans for the reconstruction of Europe. Though these plans didn’t guarantee peace for Europe, they offered a significant degree of stability for the next forty years. Indeed, the Vienna Settlement, in marked contrast to those before it and since - especially that achieved at Versailles in 1919 - stands as the most effective and long-lasting political settlement up to 1945.
For both senior commanders and for the ordinary ranks of Napoleon's army, campaigning had always been accompanied by a degree of hardship, mostly after nearly twenty years of constant war. However the immediate wake of the Russian campaign was to render the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 particularly hard, with march, counter-march, bivouac, hunger, thirst, rain, mud, cold, and privation. It would also be a time when commanders would be tested to the limit and the flaws in Napoleon's command structure would become clearly apparent.
In the past, field commanders had rarely been allowed to organize their operations except with the express orders of Napoleon and little was done to encourage them to develop independent thought or initiative. Without sufficient understanding of the Emperor's grand strategy or their own roles in it, Napoleon's subordinates could do little but follow orders unquestioningly at a time when armies had grown so much larger than in previous campaigns that Napoleon simply could not supervise everything, and needed commanders competent of independent decision-making. By 1813 some of these had been killed in action (Lannes, Desaix, Lasalle), others would die in the coming campaign (Poniatowski and Bessières), and still more were just tired of fighting or were busy in Spain. Some were excellent as leaders of men in combat, but were not themselves strategists and were hesitant to take independent decisions lest they fail.
With marshals continuously shifted from command of one corps to another and corps changing in composition as situation seemed to need, no practical command structure could be created. Appropriate control of increasingly poorer-quality soldiers became all the more difficult. Under such circumstances, with Napoleon unable to be everywhere and monitor everything, errors were inevitable, and at no time in his military career were these errors so obvious as in 1813-1815.
That this alliance had been preceded by 5 others provides a good indication of the Great Powers' failure to curb French expansion since the beginning of the wars twenty years earlier. However for Prussia and for a number of other German states, this new struggle was to have an ideological element that had been missing from her 1806-1807 war: the campaign of 1813 was to become known by its patriotic title: the 'War of German Liberation'. The moral forces which had once given impetus to the armies of revolutionary France were currently coming back to haunt them, though with some adaptations. The Prussians had no desire for a republic, however their nationalism had been awakened, and therefore the war was to be for the liberation of 'Germany', more than fifty years before an actual nation state with this name emerged.
At this stage, the coalition failed to contain all the Great Powers, however unity was crucial for success. Some nations, like Sweden and Austria, wished to wait and observe how the tide of fortune moved, however eventually they and most of the former members of the Confederation of the Rhine, including Saxony and Bavaria, would side with the Allies in numbers which Napoleon might never hope to match. Britain, too, would play a significant financial and diplomatic role in the war, ensuring Allied unity and providing millions of pounds in subsidies to nations that could supply the manpower needed. Britain had committed tens of thousands of men to the ongoing struggle in Spain, and continued to man the fleets that blockaded French ports and starved Napoleon's empire of seaborne trade.
Yet Napoleon wasn't to be overwhelmed by circumstances that lesser commanders might have considered hopeless. Quickly raising new armies composed of young, inexperienced conscripts and invalided veterans, however seriously deficient in competent non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and trained officers, and with a serious shortage of cavalry, Napoleon resolved to preserve his empire in Germany, despite the rapidly spawning forces of nationalism. The Emperor's organizational genius resurrected a new army with which he achieved hard-fought victories at Bautzen and Lützen before, in late summer, Austria finally threw in her lot with the Allies, thereby making the most formidable military alliance Europe had ever seen and the combination of Great Powers that was absolutely vital if Europe was to free itself of Napoleon's control.
Further epic struggles were to follow during the autumn campaign, including the battles of Leipzig and Dresden. When operations shifted to French soil in 1814, the beleaguered Emperor found himself outnumbered by over than three to one, nevertheless in a series of brilliant actions he managed to hold the Allies at bay, displaying a military genius reminiscent of Napoleon’s earlier years. But, with Paris threatened, Napoleon’s army overwhelmed by very greater numbers, and Napoleon’s marshals refusing to fight on, Napoleon was ultimately forced to give up, only to return the following year to fight his last, and history's greatest, battle.
Waterloo was more than a battle with far-reaching political effects: it was a human drama possibly unparalleled in military history, and it is no accident that far more has been written about this 8 hours period of time than any other in history. The defense of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, the charge of the Scots Greys, Wellington's committed infantry defying the assault of the cuirassiers, the struggle for Plancenoit, and the repulse of the Imperial Guard – all became compelling and distinct episodes in a battle on which hinged nothing less than the future of European security. When it was all over, the Allies could at last implement their historic and extensive plans for the reconstruction of Europe. Though these plans didn’t guarantee peace for Europe, they offered a significant degree of stability for the next forty years. Indeed, the Vienna Settlement, in marked contrast to those before it and since - especially that achieved at Versailles in 1919 - stands as the most effective and long-lasting political settlement up to 1945.
For both senior commanders and for the ordinary ranks of Napoleon's army, campaigning had always been accompanied by a degree of hardship, mostly after nearly twenty years of constant war. However the immediate wake of the Russian campaign was to render the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 particularly hard, with march, counter-march, bivouac, hunger, thirst, rain, mud, cold, and privation. It would also be a time when commanders would be tested to the limit and the flaws in Napoleon's command structure would become clearly apparent.
In the past, field commanders had rarely been allowed to organize their operations except with the express orders of Napoleon and little was done to encourage them to develop independent thought or initiative. Without sufficient understanding of the Emperor's grand strategy or their own roles in it, Napoleon's subordinates could do little but follow orders unquestioningly at a time when armies had grown so much larger than in previous campaigns that Napoleon simply could not supervise everything, and needed commanders competent of independent decision-making. By 1813 some of these had been killed in action (Lannes, Desaix, Lasalle), others would die in the coming campaign (Poniatowski and Bessières), and still more were just tired of fighting or were busy in Spain. Some were excellent as leaders of men in combat, but were not themselves strategists and were hesitant to take independent decisions lest they fail.
With marshals continuously shifted from command of one corps to another and corps changing in composition as situation seemed to need, no practical command structure could be created. Appropriate control of increasingly poorer-quality soldiers became all the more difficult. Under such circumstances, with Napoleon unable to be everywhere and monitor everything, errors were inevitable, and at no time in his military career were these errors so obvious as in 1813-1815.
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| In spite of the failure in Russia, the empire remained impressive in size, consisting of an over-sized France that extended to the Rhine and across the Pyrenees, and including the Low Countries, parts of northern Italy and the Dalmatian coast. Direct Bonapartist rule extended to the Kingdoms of Italy (Napoleon himself), Naples (his brother-in-law Murat), Westphalia (his brother Jerome), and Spain (his brother Joseph). Switzerland and the Duchy of Warsaw were French satellites, alongside the various states of the Confederation of the Rhine and France possessed other allies of varying loyalty, including Denmark-Norway Prussia, and Austria, the last of which gave up its imperial princess, Marie-Louise, as Napoleon's bride in 1810. By the beginning of 1813 all this was under grave threat, with Russia, Britain, Spain, and Portugal hostile, and Prussia shortly to join them. |
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References
- Fremont-Barnes, G. (2002). Essential Histories : The Napoleonic Wars (4). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
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