Wednesday, June 20, 2012

French Occupation of Germany (1807-1812)

Prussia's involvement in the campaigns of 1813-15 cloud be traced back to the autumn of 1806, when, having remained faraway from the Third Coalition, Prussia foolishly confronted Napoleon with solely Saxony at their side and with the Russian armies too far to the east to help before winter. Prussia had smarted at Napoleon's creation of the Confederation of the Rhine in the heart of Germany, and the French refusal to cede Hanover (formerly a British possession) as promised, convinced King Frederick William III (1770 1840) that the time had come to put into the field his armies, widely acknowledged to be the best in Europe. The twin decisive victories at Jena and Auerstädt on 14 October destroyed the illusion of Prussia's superiority and within weeks practically all of Prussia's forces were rounded up or besieged in fortresses and obliged to capitulate.
Seeing the vaunted Prussian ranks broken at Jena and Auerstädt was quite stunning for contemporaries, however to witness the systematic hunting down of the remnants of the army and also the pitifully weak resistance given by fortresses throughout the kingdom in the following weeks was more than Prussia could accept. Years of French occupation were to follow. The Treaty of Tilsit, concluded in July 1807, imposed subordination and in its wake Napoleon took deliberate and concerted measures to diminish not only Prussia's pride and prestige, but also Prussia's military and economic power. Prussia's status as a great power was effectively vanished when Napoleon raised the status of smaller German states like Saxony, to which he allotted all Prussian territory in Prussia's former Polish province, while imposing a number of harsh restrictions on Prussia, including a massive compensation of several hundred million francs. The much respected Queen Louise (1776-1810), icon of Prussia's former grandeur and pride, had to endure numerous personal insults under French occupation, including Napoleon's description of her as 'the only real man in Prussia', and the queen's subjects attributed her premature death to such indignities. French troops occupied Prussia's fortresses on the Oder and Prussia's ports on the Baltic, while the Continental System destroyed Prussia's seaborne commerce. Large parts of Prussia's territory were let go to the French puppet government of Westphalia and Prussia's army was restricted to 42,000 men for 10 years. By all these measures and others, Prussia was left severely - but not fatally - weakened, and with Prussia's pride badly wounded Prussia would remain a potentially dangerous time-bomb in the years after Tilsit.

Meeting at Tilsit, July 1807. While France and Russia settled their differences and established an alliance which recognized Napoleonic mastery of western and central Europe, Prussia was left truncated and humiliated: a new French satellite, the Kingdom of Westphalia, absorbed all Prussian territory west of the Elbe; Prussia was stripped of her Polish possessions to create another satellite, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Danzig was created a free city; Prussia was forced to join the Continental System; and, finally, French troops were to remain on her soil until enormous war indemnities were paid in full.

The result was a movement of reform and growing patriotism, some of it exposed for all to see, though much of it kept secret so as to prevent French detection and suppression. Young Prussians established the anti-French Tugendbunde ('League of Virtue'), and other societies which encouraged not simply a narrow form of Prussian patriotism, but a kind of pan-German unity that demanded freedom from foreign domination in general, but especially French. At official levels reforms were carried out by men like Baron Stein (1757-1831), who worked in a civilian capacity, Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) and Augustus von Gneisenau (1760-1831), who introduced radical and new changes in the army. Though aware of many of these activities, Napoleon did not fear Prussian attempts at social, economic and military reform, because he believed Frederick William to be too hesitant to oppose French might. In any event, Prussia had neither the financial nor the military resources to wage a war of national resistance.
For five years the Prussians suffered under Napoleonic occupation, their desire for vengeance and passionate hatred of the French growing more intense as the years passed. These sentiments, whether overtly simply pro-German or anti-French, had been promoted and fostered by the philosophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Johann Fichte (1762-1814). Before long, Prussians began to channel their dissatisfaction into thoughts of patriotism, embracing notions hitherto connected with the French Revolution, especially the concepts of 'nation' and, in a peculiarly German form, 'fatherland'. Unlike the French, however, the Prussians did not regard such revolutionary principles as entirely contradict with monarchy.
Queen Louise of Prussia. Revered by her subjects as the soul of national virtue, Louise openly advocated war with France in 1806 and regularly referred to Napoleon as 'the Monster'. On taking up the challenge, the Emperor announced in his Bulletin to the army' A beautiful queen wants to see a battle. So, let us be gallant and march at once .. .The two did not come face to face until the historic meeting at Tilsit in July 1807, by which time Prussia had been comprehensively beaten and occupied,
Wholesale military reforms were introduced along with social reforms, which in turn encouraged a growing sense of German nationalism between 1807 and 1813. In Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation, delivered in the winter of 1807-08 but which provided a model for many others to follow, Fichte defied the French occupiers with a less than subtle appeal for resistance to Napoleonic rule:
It is only by means of the common characteristic of being German that we can avert the downfall of our nation, which is threatened by its fusion with foreign peoples, and win back again an individuality that is self-supporting and quite incapable of any dependence on others ...we alone must help ourselves if help is to come to us ...By means of the new[system of ] education we want to mould the Germans into a corporate body ... The German, if only he makes use of all his advantages, can always be superior to the foreigner ...he alone is capable of real and rational love for his nation.
These ideas had an effect on civilians, not only among young intellectuals but also the nation as a whole, and also profoundly affected the officer corps, including men like Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who would later accomplished even greater prominence with his magnum opus, Vom Kriege ('On War'). Not only did Prussian soldiers adopt the battle cry 'Das Vaterland!' in place of 'Der König!', but they were retrained to employ entirely new tactics and methods introduced by specially organized commissions that scrapped the obsolete system employed by the armies of Frederick the Great (1713-86). These were replaced with drills, organization, tactics, and technology, based on careful studies of Napoleonic innovation. The reformers stop corporal punishment, just like in the French Revolution, as unworthy of men fighting for the 'nation' or 'fatherland', so that a soldier might follow his officers out of respect rather than fear. Just as in French revolutionary reforms, merit overcame aristocratic privilege as the principal criterion by which eager young men committed to national service acquired a commission and subsequent promotion.
Augustus Wilhelm, Count von Gneisenau. A general in the Prussian Army, Gneisenau worked with Scharnhorst in implementing wide-ranging military reforms between 1807 and 1813, including new principles for officer training, the establishment of a general staff, and the introduction of a system of reservists, by which large
numbers of men could be trained, released back into civilian life and then called up on short notice to swell the ranks of the army He performed well as Bluchers Chief of Staff from 1813 to 1815
The Prussian Army had been strictly limited to 42,000 men by Napoleonic dictat. Prussian military reformers now employed an ingenious method of circumventing this restriction, enabling them to train more soldiers without exceeding the official size of the army. A system of shrinkage (Krümpersystem) was introduced by which men called to the colors received intensive training, and joined the ranks for a limited time before being released back to civilian life. These recruits would later be recalled for further periods of training to maintain a reasonable level of fitness and acquaintance with military life, but once demobilized they became a sort of hidden reserve, which by the beginning of 1813 amounted to 80,000 men - in addition to the standing army. Therefore, as the spring campaign season opened, Prussia was reasonably ready - with Russia taking a leading role - to challenge Napoleonic authority, for spiritual and military preparations had been under way for five years. It was clear, moreover, that the winter retreat had inflicted a devastating blow to French arms, and the sight of the shattered remains of the Grande Armée shuffling on to Prussian territory encouraged those who were already inclined to resist the occupation.
Emperor Francis I of Austria. Under Francis Austria was a consistent opponent of both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, fielding armies in numerous unsuccessful campaigns (1792-97, 1800, 1805, 1809) which reduced the vast Habsburg territories in Italy, Poland, and along the Adriatic coastline. After first seeking to appease Napoleon by offering his daughter; Marie- Louise, in marriage, Francis ultimately threw in his lot with the Allies in August 1813, and accompanied his army until the fall of Paris.
Resistance emerged elsewhere in Germany during this period. While Austria again opposed France in 1809, Napoleon subdued Austria once more, taking Vienna in May, suffering a temporary check at Aspern- Essling, and finally emerging victorious at Wagram on 5 July. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn (14 October), Emperor Francis I (1768-1835) ceded land to the Confederation of the Rhine, to Saxony, and to the Kingdom of Italy. Russia, by then in possession of Swedish Finland, received part of Austria's Polish territories in Galicia. Francis, playing for time in which to recover and reorganize both his army and his shattered finances, offered Napoleon - now divorced from the Empress Josephine (1763-1814) - the hand in marriage of his daughter, the Archduchess Marie-Louise (1791-1847), and the two produced a son, Napoleon II (1811-32), born on 20 April 1811, and known as the 'King of Rome'.
Hereafter, signs of growing German resistance became particularly marked. Not only had Austria risen up, but many individual Germans began to question the legitimacy of French domination of central European affairs. Already in 1806 the French had executed a bookseller from Nuremberg named Johann Palm (1768-1806) for printing and distributing anti-French literature. In 1809 a young Thuringian, bent on assassinating Napoleon and in so doing accelerating the French withdrawal from Germany, was executed. And in the following year Andreas Hofer (1767-1810), who had raised the standard of revolt in the Tyrol just prior to the campaign of 1809, was also executed. The French had also demanded that the Prussian government arrest and hand over their foreign minister, Stein, for alleged conspiracies against France, and only Stein's refuge in Russia prevented a lengthy prison term and possibly death. Such heavy-handed policies against German patriots, accused of treason while merely questioning the French presence in their midst, began to effect a profound change in German attitudes.

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References

Fremont-Barnes, G. (2002). Essential Histories : The Napoleonic Wars (4). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

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