Caesar's Gallic Wars (58 – 50 BC) : Opposing Forces

The Roman army that campaigned in Gaul in the 1st century BC was to all intents and purposes a professional one, with many soldiers in the legions regarding their military service as a career. The soldiers were equipped, trained and paid by the state, often serving for many years at a stretch. The Gallic armies were completely different. Gallic warfare was based on the values of a warrior society; while the elite warriors may have been able to spend time raiding neighboring tribes and may have possessed high quality arms and armor, tribes were unable to maintain armies for long because of the lack of any organized supply system and the need for many of those fighting to return to their fields. The Roman conquest of Gaul was a clash between two cultures employing very different methods of waging war.

The Romans

The Roman was made up of two types of of troops: the legions, comprising Roman citizens and auxiliaries, and non-Romans who fought alongside Roman generals because of treaty obligations or out of choice. When Caesar started his governorship he had four legions assigned to his command, but he immediately began recruiting more, mainly from northern Italy, and possibly not being too strict about the citizen status of his recruits, since much of the population of Cisalpine Gaul did not have full Roman citizenship.

In the Imperial period a legion was usually commanded by a legate who was a senator or equestrian, but in the late Republic the legion had no permanent commander. Instead, the provincial governor appointed senators from his staff to command one or more legions. These might he legates of quite senior status (Caesar's most experienced legate, Labienus, had held the important magistracy of Praetor), or they might be much younger men like Publius Crassus who was just beginning his senatorial career. Each legion had six military tribunes who were usually equestrians or the sons of senators gaining military experience before starting their own political careers. The most important officers within the legion were the centurions, and there were 60 in each legion. Appointed for their bravery and experience, these men were responsible for the training of their centuries and the day-to-day running of the legion whether on campaign or in winter quarters. The senior centurions of each legion (the primi ordines) regularly attended Caesar's councils of war and would have contributed to strategic discussions; they were the backbone of the legion.

Legionaries were uniformed at state expense, and were well equipped for their military roles. Each legionary, with his mail coat and bronze or iron helmet, was armed as well as the most wealthy and successful Celtic warriors and this must have given them a huge psychological advantage when facing the Gauls. The large shield or scutum provided additional protection. The legionary's principal weapons were the pilum (javelin) and short sword, the gladius.

Recruitment to the legions was based on a mixture of conscription and volunteering, the only qualification for service being Citizenship, at least in theory. Recruits were supposed to be at least 17, although the majority were in their early 20s when they joined up. Roman ideology preferred recruits from rural backgrounds rather than from towns and cities with their softening and corrupting influences, but Caesar probably experienced little difficulty in raising troops for his campaigns in Gaul because there had previously been little wide-scale recruitment in Cisalpine Gaul. The legionaries signed up for military service of no fixed length, although they could expect to be discharged with a grant of land on which to settle after five years or so continuous service. Military pay was not especially good, but there were plenty of opportunities for enrichment, particularly on a lucrative campaign like Caesar's conquest of Gaul with the likelihood of generous amounts of booty.

While the legions were armed and equipped uniformly, and were principally heavy infantry, the variation in type of forces a successful army needed was provided by “auxiliary” units raised from other provinces of the Roman empire or from neighbouring states and tribes friendly to Rome. It was up to the provincial governor to maintain friendly relationships established by his predecessors with local tribes, such as the treaty of friendship between Rome and the Aedui. Caesar was so successful in his early campaigns in Gaul and his military prestige so great that he was able to attract auxiliary units from the Germans as well as support from Gallic tribes, who provided him with another source of cavalry that was particularly valuable when the loyalty of the Aedui wavered in 52 BC. Auxiliaries used their own fighting techniques, they were not trained in the Roman style of fighting, and were commanded by their own officers, usually members of the ruling elite of the tribe or state from which they were recruited.

Auxiliaries provided the Roman army's main cavalry force. The cavalry Caesar employed in Gaul, consisting mainly of Gallic or Germanic elites, was not always reliable or effective, and sometimes they lacked discipline, particularly early on in the campaigns. Its drubbing by the Nervian cavalry in 57 BC was probably the most serious setback it suffered, and by the end of the campaigns the cavalry was a powerful force that contributed to Caesar's victory in the Civil War. The German cavalry sometimes worked in concert with light infantry which allowed the holding of terrain in addition to the useful mobility of cavalry.

The Celtic-style saddle allowed Caesar's cavalry to be as effective as later stirruped cavalry, despite the absence of stirrups. Cavalry troops might vary considerably in their equipment, since they equipped themselves, hut a wealthy cavalryman might have a mail shirt and helmet, an oval or hexagonal shield which was more manoeuvrable on horseback than a rectangular one, a spear and a long sword, which was ideal for running down those fleeing from battle, one of the principal roles of the cavalry.

The Roman army in Gaul included slingers from the Balearics and archers from Crete and Numidia who provided lightly armed mobile troops to increase the firepower of the army, particularly at a distance or in a siege. Their role is rarely commented upon, but they added an important degree of flexibility to the Roman army. Additional infantry was provided by Gallic tribes in the same way as cavalry, and would have consisted of groups of warriors from tribes who were allied to Rome like the Aedui or Remi who surrendered to Caesar following his invasion. The wealthiest of these warriors were probably armed and equipped in a way very similar to the Roman legionaries, but the Gauls placed greater emphasis on individual prowess and prominent displays of courage in battle, rather than the discipline and training of the legions.

Logistical support was generally well organised, with a supply system usually reliant on shuttling provisions from a supply base to the campaigning army. The army made use of Gaul's navigable rivers to move supplies around, but the poor road system and the speed of Caesar's movements led to difficulties. Although Caesar could call on his Gallic allies and later the subjected tribes for supplies, his movements and the direction of the campaign were often heavily influenced by logistical demands. An understanding of this lay behind the Gallic scorched-earth policy in the revolt of 52 BC. When the legions were in winter quarters, Caesar ensured they were garrisoned in the territories of recently conquered tribes to serve the dual purpose of ensuring a strong military presence in newly reduced territory, and punishing those who resisted Rome by forcing them to feed the occupying army, a penalty that could have affected a tribe's ability to support its own population. The winter allowed troops time to recover from the often exhaustive campaigning that Caesar demanded of his armies, in particular those who were sick or had been wounded in fighting. Roman imperial armies had medics attached to them, and this may have been the case in the late Republic, too. In the aftermath of pitched battle Roman armies usually paused, sometimes for several days, so the dead could be buried and the wounded treated. The wounded would later be escorted to a base, probably a supply base, to recuperate before rejoining their units.

Gauls, Britons and Germans

In the 1st century BC Celtic tribes employed different methods of warfare. Although prowess in combat remained important for the tribal elite, in some tribes, particularly in southern and central Gaul, other means were becoming available to gain and maintain status. The Aeduan aristocrat Dumnorix fought as a cavalryman to display his elite warrior status, but he also held a monopoly over the wine trade, which enhanced his wealth and therefore his position within Celtic society. Encouraged by the impact of Mediterranean culture on Gallic society, the Romans interpreted this shift in emphasis as a demoralizing factor.  Caesar perceived the Belgae as the bravest of the Gauls 'because they are furthest away from the culture and civilization of Provence, and are least often visited by merchants importing degenerate luxury goods, and also because they are nearest to the Germans who live across the Rhine and with whom they are continuously at war'.
In most Gallic tribes, raiding neighbors was the warrior's principal means of acquiring wealth and position, and tribes sought to extend their influence over smaller neighbors. The bravest tribes, and therefore the most secure, were those with wide influence and many dependent tribes. Tribes might form alliances with neighbors or even, in the case of the Sequani, the Germans, in order to increase their own military prowess. Gallic war bands consisted of groups of warriors belonging to an elite class, following their chieftain and concentrating on raiding; larger-scale armies of the kind faced by the Romans in Gaul were probably less common, and may have included peasants, the dependent farmers who would not normally have been involved in regular warfare. If Caesar really did face an army of 50,000 Helvetii and their allies, it probably included tribesmen of all status, but we hear no details of them or how they were armed and equipped. The warriors equipped themselves according to their wealth and status: the braver and more successful, the more likely they were to be able to adorn themselves with beautifully decorated and high quality equipment.
Only the wealthiest warriors would have possessed mail coats, but such aristocrats could have been equipped in a way very similar to a Roman legionary, with the mail armor providing reasonably good protection from the slashing blows of the long Celtic swords, a bronze or iron helmet, sword and shield. Helmets, like mail coats, were probably very rare and worn only by the wealthiest warriors, but stylistically they were very similar to some Roman helmets; indeed the coolus  helmet which evolved into one of the main helmets of the Roman imperial army was originally a Gallic design. Gallic warriors carried spears and swords, the latter considerably longer than the Roman gladius. They were designed primarily for slashing rather than stabbing, and pointed to a fighting technique that required plenty of room for the individual to wield his long weapon. Though the Greek historian Polybius claims these long swords had a tendency to bend on impact, many were made of high quality iron and they were extremely effective weapons. The Gallic elongated rectangular shield was probably made of hide or wood like the Roman scutum. Some shields may not have been particularly thick or strong, which may explain why Caesar reports that the Roman pila were able to pierce several of them simultaneously; the bronze shields that survive from antiquity may have been for decorative or ceremonial purposes and not actually for use in battle. Given that the majority of warriors probably lacked body armor, and indeed some may have chosen to fight without armor to stress their courage and military prowess, the shield was a vital piece of protective equipment. When their shields were put out of action by the Roman pilla, the Helvetii became dangerously exposed to the Roman attack.
Celtic cavalry, manned by the wealthiest warriors, was particularly effective and scored significant victories against Caesar's more numerous auxiliary cavalry in the first couple of campaigning seasons. The lack of stirrups was no bar to powerful cavalry: the design of the Celtic saddle provided its rider with a secure mount from which to throw spears, thrust with a spear or slash with a sword and implement shock tactics. Some German cavalry may have used these saddles as well, but the horsemanship of the cavalrymen and their co-operation with the light infantry who regularly worked alongside the German cavalry was clearly impressive and indicative of at least some training, which we hear little about in any sources. The Celtic tribes in Britain were still using chariots, something that had gone out of fashion on the Continent, but their speed and agility caused the Roman infantry serious difficulties. The chariots served as battlefield 'taxis' for the wealthiest nobles, dropping them off at the fighting and then collecting them up again if they were injured or needed to withdraw from the battle.
Firepower was available in the form of slingers and archers, although these men were probably not members of the warrior class, as this form of warfare was not really regarded as 'heroic'. Slingers were sometimes involved in open warfare (such as the Gallic ambush of a Roman column in 54 BC), but more often in the defense of hill forts, along with archers. In preparation for the general revolt of 52 BC, Vercingetorix called up all the archers of Gaul; they were probably Gauls of the lower classes, but were vital to the success of the strategy of the revolt.
Very little is known about the organization of Gallic armies and their workings in pitched battle, although they seem to have relied heavily on the effectiveness of infantry and cavalry charges at the start of battle to break the enemy lines. Pitched battle, even at a small scale, provided one of the best opportunities to display military prowess and so was an important way of making war, but not all Gallic tribes were so keen on meeting the enemy in the open, especially when that enemy was as powerful as Rome, so the strategies of the tribes varied. While some stronger tribes and coalitions like the Nervii were eager to meet the Romans in pitched battle, others like the tribes of Aquitania in south-western Gaul relied more on hit-and-run tactics and attacking the invaders' supply lines as Vercingetorix planned to do during the revolt of 52 BC. Some of the coastal tribes who possessed mobile wealth (usually in the form of cattle) were able to withdraw into marshlands and avoid direct conflict with the Romans, Like the Menapii and Morini of the Channel coast. The Veneti, whose wealth was founded on trade and whose military strength was maritime, based their strategy around defense of hill forts situated on coastal promontories, simply moving by sea to another when one was about to be captured by the Romans. Different tribes, then, had the military capacity to adapt their strategies to deal with the new threat of Rome, and some of these variations were quite successful in impeding Roman progress. Hit-and-run tactics and the avoidance of pitched battle may also have been preferred by Gallic tribes, or necessitated by the absence of the kind of logistical support that Roman armies could depend upon. Large Gallic armies could not remain in existence for very long and unless a decisive engagement quickly occurred, such an army would usually have to disband because of lack of supplies. The Belgic army in 57 BC, which combined many different tribes, was forced to dissipate for this reason when a decisive engagement with Caesar was not forthcoming.
The professional Roman army had many advantages over the armies of the Gallic warrior societies and it was not surprising that several tribes quickly went over to Rome, or that under the leadership of such an effective general as Caesar, the conquest of Gaul was completed remarkably quickly.

Gallic flair and Roman discipline

Gallic and Roman fighting styles were the complete antithesis of each other. For both cultures, victory in pitched battle was the ultimate accolade for a warrior or soldier, and also for tribal chieftains and Roman generals. To show courage on the battlefield was expected; to die in battle was glorious. By the mid-1st century BC, when Caesar began his conquest of Gaul, Romans and Gauls had been fighting each other on and off for centuries. In their literature the Romans betrayed both a fear of their barbarian neighbors, and a sneaking admiration for the way they fought. Gauls were perceived as much larger than Romans (they are portrayed as being of almost giant stature in some accounts); certainly they probably were generally a little taller than the average Italian legionary, and the Romans seem to have been rather defensive about being shorter than their adversaries. Nonetheless, the style of fighting they employed was perfect for fighting Gauls. Indeed, the organization of legions into maniples (120-man units), and the introduction of the large scutum and short gladius as the principal weapons of legionary hand-to-hand combat may have been inspired by conflicts with the Gauls in the 4th century BC.
The Gallic fighting style allowed the warrior to display himself on the battlefield, either through fighting naked or by wearing elaborately decorated armor, and he showed off his valor by fighting as an individual. The warrior's long sword required him to have a fair amount of space around him on the battlefield in order to operate properly. The Celtic sword was essentially a slashing weapon and in the hands of a tall Gallic warrior with a long reach, could be a deadly blade, particularly against shorter opposition with short swords. But the Gallic warriors fought as individuals; though training and especially experience must have provided them with some understanding of tactics, and commands could have been communicated on the battlefield through musical instruments, they did not possess the same degree of training to fight as a unit that Roman soldiers did. When forced to retreat, they could not always maintain ranks and withdraw in good order, something that required considerable training and absolute trust in one's fellow soldiers. This made them vulnerable to outflanking maneuvers and to cavalry attacks on retreating warriors. Lack of space to swing their swords could also cause havoc in the Gallic ranks. When forced together, Gallic warriors could not use their swords properly, and this made them vulnerable to an enemy who could operate at very close quarters with deadly efficiency.
The Roman legionary's equipment did not make him reliant on his neighbor's shield for protection in combat as in a Greek phalanx formation, as he fought as an individual, but he was dependent on the strength of his unit. If his comrades in his century, cohort or legion gave way, he would eventually become exposed to attack on the flank or rear. The might of the Roman army lay in the strength of its formations, and that was based on unit morale, discipline and training. These can clearly be seen when Caesar's legions came under sudden attack by the Nervii in the second season of campaigning. The legionaries did not even need their officers to give them orders: they automatically dropped their entrenching tools, picked up their weapons, and formed a battle line. Their training ensured that even though they were not with their own units and the men they normally fought with, they were resourceful enough to create an effective line of battle. Roman soldiers were not automatons in a 'military machine': they were trained to think and use their initiative as well as follow orders. The training and discipline instilled in the soldiers meant that Roman units could move over battlefields in formation and even retreat while maintaining a defensive formation, an invaluable technique in warfare for minimizing casualties.
In combat with their taller Gallic opponents with their slashing swords, they threw their pila and then moved in very close for hand-to-hand combat. The large scutum protected most of the legionary's front and left side, his short gladius was ideal for stabbing in close-quarter fighting and he could even punch at the enemy with the metal boss of his shield. If the legionaries moved in close enough, they could literally cramp the style of their Gallic opponents while still giving themselves the small amount of room they needed to operate effectively. The short gladius was a brutally efficient tool for killing: a short stab at the torso or especially the belly of his opponent, who may well have been fighting without armor, and he would have been killed or badly injured with damage to internal organs and serious bleeding. Though Roman soldiers were trained to stab with their swords, that did not stop them from slashing with them, and the fine quality and perfect weighting of the gladius meant that they could easily hack off limbs. The average Roman legionary may have been shorter in stature than his Gallic opponent, but his equipment meant he was not at a disadvantage. Moreover, the tactics and fighting style employed in pitched battle against Celtic opponents turned it into an advantage. Usually, in pitched battle Roman discipline triumphed over Gallic flair.

References

Gilliver, K. (2003). Caesar's Gallic Wars. New York: Osprey Publishing Ltd.

Background of Caesar's Gallic Wars

Romans and Gauls had been conflicting for centuries prior to the conquest of Gaul in the 1st century BC, but for long times they had also experienced relative peace as neighbors or near neighbors. Celtic or Gallic tribes (as the Greek writers called them) migrated into northern Italy during the late 5th and early 4th centuries BC, with some tribes settling, mainly around the fertile Po valley. The first major encounter between Rome and these Celtic tribes of what is called as the La Tène culture, came in the early 4th century BC. They enter south into Latium and Etruria (Lazio and Toscana) where the invaders captured and sacked a number of the largest cities, including the important Etruscan center of Veii only a few miles north of Rome.   In 390 BC Rome's field forces were defeated, and the poorly defended city captured by the Gauls. Only the citadel held out: according to tradition, when the Gauls tried to scale it in a surprise night attack, the guard dogs failed to bark and it was only the honking of geese (kept on the Capitol because they were sacred to Jupiter) that awoke the guards. The guards then repelled the attack. The story may not he true, but after sacking Rome, or being paid off by the Romans, the Gauls withdrew. They were defeated soon afterwards by Camillus, the great Roman general who is traditionally recognized by making fundamental changes to the Roman army in order to deal with this new Gallic threat. The sacking of Rome was never forgotten, and Romans remained haunted by a kind of collective inherited fear of hordes of barbarians returning to destroy the city. The sack, along with the long subsequent history of violent encounters between the two cultures, formed part of the background to Caesar's conquest of Gaul.

During the 150 years after the sack, Rome was progressively able to establish superiority over much of the Italian peninsula, ejecting several of the Gallic tribes from lands to the north of Rome. Between the First and Second Punic Wars (during the 3rd century BC this conquest of Italy extended to the north as a coalition of Gallic tribes from northern Italy and across the Alps moved south, only to suffer a devastating defeat at Telamon in 225 BC which broke Gallic resistance in Italy. In the next five years the majority of the territory beyond the Po was incorporated as the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and Roman colonies were founded at Cremona and Piacenza. The final reduction of this new province had to wait until after the Second Punic War and the repulse of the Carthaginian raiding forces under Hannibal. After the first big Roman defeat at the hands of Hannibal at the Trebia in 218 BC, Gallic mercenaries flocked to join Hannibal and served with him through much of the Italian campaign. But after defeating Carthage, Rome turned back to north ltaly and punished the tribes who had fought against them. The whole of ltaly as far north as the Alps was incorporated as Roman territory and further colonies were created at Parma and Bologna. By the middle of 2nd century BC Rome was ready to move into France, having secured her occupation of the whole of Cisalpine Gaul.

Detail from the Altar of Domitius Ahenabarbus, a st century BC relief illustrating the taking of a census which included details of the military liability to every citizen. The two soldiers represent the link between citizen status and military service. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

The reason came in 154 BC when the Greek city of Marseilles requested help from Rome against raids from Liguria. The Roman response included the establishment of a small veteran settlement at Aix en Provence, which irritated the powerful Alloboges tribe nearby, on whose territory it was founded. The Alloboges and their allies, including the Arverni, were defeated in a series of campaigns fought by Fabius Maximus  and Domitius Ahenobarbus. Fabius inflicted an appalling defeat on the Gauls in 121 BC, claiming the quite extraordinary (and highly unlikely) casualty figures of 120,000 Gallic dead to only 15 Roman. The new province of Transalpine Gaul was created, which the Romans frequently referred to as simply 'The Province', from which modern Provence gets its name. As in Cisalpine Gaul, colonies were founded, at Toulouse and Nimes, and a road was built, the Via Domitia, linking Italy with Spain. As well as leading to the creation of another province, the campaign to assist Marseilles also brought Rome into alliance with the Aedui, a Gallic tribe of modern Burgundy who were also allied to Marseilles. The existence of the new province and a formal alliance with the Aedui give Rome with opportunities for further intervention in Gaul and the affairs of the Gallic tribes, but any Further expansion was brought to a sudden stop by the arrival in southern Gaul of the Cimhri and Teutones. These migrating Germanic tribes give serious resistance to Rome, defeating successive consular armies in the late 2nd century BC. They were eventually beaten by Marius (a great Roman general and consul), but as with the Gallic sack of 390 BC, the experience left scars on the Roman psyche. Future Roman attacks and campaigns against Germanic tribes could be passed off as revenge for the defeats and casualties of the 2nd century incursions.

By the 1st century BC several tribes in Gaul were becoming urbanized, especially those in the south where they came under the cultural influence of Marseilles and then, with the establishment of the province of Transalpine Gaul, Rome. Although Caesar uses the word oppidum to describe hill forts, he also uses it for defended settlements that were not on hills. Some of these could have been described as towns even by Romans who might have regarded Gaul and nearly everything about it and its inhabitants as barbaric. Avaricum (Bourges) had an open space which Caesar called a forum and may have had civic buildings; it had a huge defensive wall and its inhabitants regarded it as the most beautiful city in Gaul. Cenabum (Orleans) had a series of narrow streets which may well have had some kind of plan to them: Gallic towns were starting to adopt the grid plans of Mediterranean cities. Evidence of coin manufacture at important oppida suggests that they may have been tribal capitals, indicating some degree of political centralization; Bibracte, for example, seems to have been the 'capital' of the Aedui, who were a fairly centralized tribe although plagued by factions. Other tribes that lacked this degree of centralization might have been considered culturally backward by the Romans, but this added to their military reputation: Caesar considered the Belgae to be the bravest warriors of the Gauls because they were furthest removed from Roman influence. Their lack of centralization also meant that they could be harder to conquer, as Caesar was to find when fighting tribes like the Veneti and Menapii who had no single center of occupation and wealth.

One of the main reasons for the Roman and Greek influence on the Gallic tribes was trade. Marseilles was a significant center of trade, and though Gallic tribes and Rome frequently clashed each other, that did not prevent a huge amount of trade taking place between them well prior to the conquest under Caesar. Romans imported raw materials from Gaul, including iron, grain, hides and, particularly, slaves, the source of the latter being regular inter-tribal warfare that occur between both Gallic and Germanic tribes. In exchange, the Gauls (or at least the Gallic elite) received luxury goods and foods, and enormous amounts of wine. Wine had become a key symbol of wealth, status and 'civilisation', though the historian Diodorus Siculus says that the Gauls drank it neat, rather than diluted with water in the Roman style. Hence, although they were adopting the 'civilized' customs of the Mediterranean, Diodorus makes it clear that they were still barbarians because they did not know how to drink it properly. He goes on to say that wine had become such a valuable commodity that the exchange rate for an amphora of wine was one slave, although there were certainly plenty of slaves around. There must have been many Roman merchants already in Gaul before Caesar's campaigns, including a community of citizens at Cenabum. Some of them were of high status and belonged to the Roman 'equestrian' order, the influential class immediately below senatorial rank, itself a prime source of new senators. They might expect to benefit from the opportunities conquest would bring, especially if they provided assistance in the form of intelligence and supplies for the Roman army.

A sliver coin of the Aeduan leader Dumnorix. The coin shows an Aeduan warrior with a boar standard. Whilst the Aedui were allied to Rome, there were anti-Roman elements within the tribe led by the aristocratic druid Dumnorix, who Caesar called as 'a man of boundless daring'. (AKG Berlin)

Many of the tribes that had come under greater influence from the Roman and Greek cultures to the south were ruled by oligarchies with annually appointed magistrates. The spreading centralization and tendency towards urbanization made such tribes easier targets for Rome, and internal factions within them helped the Romans too. In the mid-1st century BC the Aedui were divided between a pro-Roman faction under Diviciacus, and those who opposed the Romans led by his brother Dumnorix. Dumnorix held a monopoly over the wine trade on the Saône, a tributary of the Rhône. and probably resisted the growing Roman influence for economic as well as political reasons. His influence came from his wealth and his position as a druid: druids held high social status in Celtic society which could bring them political influence. According to the account by Caesar, Dumnorix was attempting to increase his power-base within the Aedui not just because he was opposed to the tribe's pro-Roman stance, but because he was keen to seize power and make himself king. It was important for Rome that the Aedui remained a united and powerful ally of Rome among the Celtic tribes of Gaul, and the squabbling between the two brothers must have given Rome cause for concern.
But the Aedui were coming under pressure from other tribes in Gaul in the 1st century BC. They were a powerful tribe with other lesser tribes under their protection and they had a long-standing rivalry with their neighbors, the Arverni. This rivalry came to a head in 71 BC when the Amerni attacked, along with their allies the Sequani, and German mercenaries from the Suebi whom the Sequani had rather foolishly invited in.  Once the Aedui were defeated the German mercenaries under their king Ariovistus turned on their erstwhile allies and seized much of the Sequanian territory. These events had several consequences. Rome failed to assist her ally, the Aedui, which must have damaged her reputation amongthe Gallic tribes, and Germans were now settling in Gaul near the territory of the Helvetii. This must have seriously worried the Helvetii who had already been forced into Switzerland by earlier migrations of Germanic tribes and they prepared to evacuate their homelands and migrate themselves, to western France.
In 61 BC the Roman senate had confirmed its support for the Aedui, but still failed to act. Romans were expecting some kind of involvement with Gaul in 60 BC though, perhaps military support for the Aedui. Probably because of concern about the huge migration which was obviously about to take place, preparations were made in Rome, including the holding of a levy. During his consulship in 59 BC Julius Caesar had bought off the Suebic king Ariovistus bydiplomatic gifts and the title of Friend of the Roman People. It was not an unusual move for a leading politician to make alliances with kings outside the Roman empire, especially kings of neighbouring territories who might supply additional troops for a campaign. During his year as Consul, Caesar also engineered for himself the appointment as governor of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum (the Adriatic coast of Dalmatia); when at the end of the year the governor of Transalpine Gaul suddenly died, Caesar was given that command as well. The forces under his command consisted of one legion based in Transalpine Gaul and three more legions that were in garrison at Aquileia in north-east Italy, based there because of the potential threats from Ariovistus and the Helvetii to the north and the Dacians to the north-east. Caesar may have been planning a campaign against Illyricum initially, but the late addition of Transalpine Gaul to his command opened up a better option.

A barge bang pulled upriver by manpower: Many of Gauls rivers were navigable and provided excellent trade routes, and supply and communication conduits for the invading Roman army Gaulish leader were keen to import luxury goods, such as wine. in return for raw materials such as iron, grain and slaves

Caesar was an ambitious politician and in order to dominate politics as a senator in Rome in the 1st century BC, it helped to be extremely wealthy (to bribe the electorate). to have a great military reputation. Of his two allies and rivals, Marcus Crassus was fabulously rich, and Pompey was both wealthy and Rome's leading general after conquering much of Spain and Turkey. On his appointment as governor of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, Caesar was pretty much broke and had had little opportunity to establish himself as an able general. Conquest of a new province would allow him both to enrich himself and impress the public in Rome with his military ability. There was no doubt at all that Caesar would campaign somewhere and conquer a new province. either on the eastern Adriatic coast or in Gaul. It just happened that there were two convenient pretexts for launching operations in Gaul: the Helvetii began their migration just as Caesar was taking over command, and there was still the matter of Rome's previous failure to support their allies the Aedui. If they requested assistance, particularly against the German King Ariovistus, Caesar could justifiably intervene. At the start of 58 BC the new governor of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul was still in Rome when news arrived of the movement of the Helvetian tribes.

References

Gilliver, K. (2003). Caesar's Gallic Wars. New York: Osprey Publishing Ltd.

Caesar's Gallic Wars (58 – 50 BC)

Julius Caesar is possibly the most legendary Roman of all. As dictator, Caesar lead the establishment of the Roman Empire with his nephew Augustus as an emperor, more scandalously, Caesar had a love affair with Cleopatra of Egypt, and even invented the leap year, before being assassinated by colleagues and friends who had in the past supported him. However prior to his dictatorship Caesar had conquered a huge area of Europe during a very short time. The provinces of Gaul invaded by Caesar (Gallia Lugdunensis, Gallia Belgica and Aquitania) are now known as Luxembourg, Belgium, France and Germany to the west of the Rhine, an area of over 300,000 square miles. The political map of much of modern Europe can be traced back to Julius Caesar's 9 years of campaigning. In his battles in Gaul, Caesar also became the first Roman to cross the Rhine at the head of an army, and to cross the Channel to Britain, an island that contemporaries considered a mysterious, terrible and perhaps mythical place.

There is only one detailed account surviving of this amazing war, and this account was written by Caesar himself. As well as being a great, extraordinarily fortunate general and an inspirational leader of men, Caesar was an wise politician fully aware of the importance of self-presentation. In today's terms, Caesar was his own, extremely able spin-doctor. Caesar's De Bellu Gallicu (Gallic War) is the most detailed eye-witness account of war that survives from the Greek or Roman world. Caesar wrote up his commentaries annually and had them published in Rome every year. Everyone in the capital was hungry for news of events in Gaul and there was great excitement at the progress of the war. Caesar made sure they got a one-sided version of events that stressed the magnitude of the Roman victories and his part in them, and underplayed the size and significance of the reverses. The historical reconstruction of the conquest of Gaul must be accomplished using this one extremely biased source, a few brief descriptions in other works of literature written by Romans, and limited archaeological evidence. There is nothing that presents the aims, motives or feelings of the Gauls, except Caesar's interpretation of them, since they had no tradition of recording their history.

The conquest of Gaul occur in the middle of political and cultural change not only in Gaul but also in Rome. By the middle of 1st century BC, parts of Gaul were starting to become urbanized and 'Romanised' when they adopted some of the customs of the inhabitants of the neighboring Roman province of Transalpine Gaul in southern France. Roman traders were very active in Gaul, especially in the southern and central areas, and they also helped to spread their own culture, exchanging “luxury” goods such as wine in return for iron, grain, slaves and hides. Some of the Gallic tribes were developing more centralized forms of organisation, and towns were beginning to grow. Ironically, this helped to make the Roman conquest, when it came, more straightforward: while some of the more “Romanised” tribes such as the Aedui allied themselves to the invaders, some of those who resisted were easier to conquer because they were centralised and had clear centers of occupation and wealth. The tribes with few key occupation centers often had more mobile wealth and resources, and could more easily avoid conquest simply by evading the Romans. Rome itself was sliding towards civil war as a political system designed for a small city-state could no longer manage controlling a huge empire. Leading politicians fought with each other for power and gathered support from their peers, the common people, and the armies that they had commanded when governing Rome's provinces. Military success and loyal soldiers were prerequisites for becoming a leading figure in the power games, and huge areas of the Mediterranean were swiftly conquered by ambitious Romans. Most recently, Pompey, lately returned from the East after a glorious tour of conquest had set new standards for others to imitate. In 59 BC, when Julius Caesar engineered for himself the governorship of Dalmatia and Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy), there was no doubt that Caesar would conduct campaigns to enhance his military reputation and political future. When the governorship of Transalpine Gaul (southern France) was added to Caesar’s command and the Helvetii in Switzerland began a huge migration, Caesar decided to campaign in Gaul.

In the next few years the Romans made rapid conquests throughout Gaul. The task was made easier by the incapability of the Gallic tribes to unite and form a combined resistance to the invaders. In fact, some tribes supported the Romans, and the Romans themselves played one tribe off against another, exploiting the territorial ambitions of different Gallic tribes and even political divisions in the tribes. Few Gallic armies were able to resist the disciplined and well-equipped Roman legions, and Caesar was able to draw on an increasingly large and experienced army, in addition to allies from Gaul and occasionally Germany to supply him with cavalry in particular. In three years of leading his army into Gaul, Caesar was able to state that the whole province was conquered and lead his army into Germany and across the Channel to Britain, expeditions that provoked shocked admiration back in Rome.

Gaul may have been conquered, but the Gauls were not. The last years of Caesar’s command were spent dealing with sporadic revolts across the province, which were followed, in 52 BC, by a major uprising. Finally the Gauls had found a leader who could unite them: Vercingetorix. The year 52 BC was make or break for both sides: the Gauls pursued a guerrilla campaign of hit-and-run tactics and a scorched-earth policy, while the Romans utilized more sophisticated engineering skills; it also saw two huge-scale sieges of hill forts at Avaricum (Bourges) and Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine, near Dijon). It was at Alesia that the whole war in Gaul came to a climax, and when the army raised to relieve the besieged Gauls war repulsed, the revolt was effectively over. The relieving army dissolved and Vercingetorix surrendered. Though it was not until the reign of the first emperor, Augustus, that Gaul was properly pacified (and even after that there are indications of the occasional rumble into the middle of 1st century AD, the Gauls were never able to unite effectively again. Gaul became several Roman provinces, evolving after five centuries into the Frankish kingdoms and eventually becoming France. Julius Caesar went on to fight and win a civil war, and make himself dictator of Rome, only to he assassinated in 44 BC

Potrait of Julius Caesar (c. 102-44 BC) the Roman politician and general who conquered Gaul in the middle of 1st century BC.

References

Gilliver, K. (2003). Caesar's Gallic Wars. New York: Osprey Publishing Ltd.

Franco-Russian relations (1805-1812)

Russia had been instrumental in forming the Third Coalition in 1805 (including Austria, Britain, Sweden, and Naples) and had contributed substantial military resources to the campaign that ended disastrously for the forces of Tsar Alexander I (1777-1825) and his Austrian allies at Austerlitz, in Moravia, on 2 December 1805. Austria soon abandoned the coalition, while Alexander withdrew his army through Bohemia - Rusian army was badly shaken but not destroyed.

When Prussia challenged France in the autumn of 1806, Russia prepared to help Prussia, but military intervention did not become effective until early 1807, by which time Prussia had been thoroughly beaten, and the costly struggle at Eylau on 7 February and, finally, the decisive defeat at Friedland on 14 June, persuaded Alexander to seek terms with Napoleon, in conjunction with the Prussian king. The peace of Tilsit the following month sparked a diplomatic revolution, converting France and Russia from adversaries into allies, with Europe split between them and a chastened Frederick William in control of a much weakened Prussia. By secret clauses in the treaty France promised to assist Russia in 'liberating' most of European Turkey, while in return Russia agreed to open hostilities with Britain and Turkey if Britain refused the Tsar's mediation.

Both sides promised to pressure Sweden, Denmark and Portugal into conforming to the Continental System - Napoleon's ambitious scheme to close the whole European coastline to British commerce in an attempt to strangle the British economy. Russia cooperated, albeit unenthusiastically, and duly declared war on Britain in November (and invaded Swedish territory in 1808), though war with Britain amounted to little more than the cessation of trade with her. Napoleon and Alexander renewed their agreement at a conference at Erfurt in September 1808, while French armies were busy in Spain trying to subdue that nation as part of the same scheme to eradicate British trade with the Continent.

Alexander I of Russia.The Tsar's formidable forces opposed the French in 1805 and 1807, before Napoleon finally decided to invade Alexander's vast empire. Despite the occupation of Moscow, Alexander not only refused to negotiate, but pursued the French out of Russia and across Germany in a relentless campaign to reach Paris and overthrow the Bonaparte dynasty. Russia's major contribution to victory and Alexander's considerable influence on affairs at the Congress of Vienna established Russia as the most powerful nation on the Continent until the Crimean War

That close Franco-Russian relations never fully developed may be divined by Alexander's decision to stand aloof during the 1809 campaign, his armies merely observing on the Austrian frontiers. With victory achieved over Austria for the fourth time since 1792 (1797, 1800 and 1805), Napoleon's new friendship, such as it was,with the Habsburg monarchy caused considerable concern at St Petersburg, and in any event by 1810 Russia was growing tired of the economic hardship caused by her inability to carry on trade with Britain. Pro-British factions in the court of St Petersburg were now once again in the ascendant and there were signs that Napoleon was not fulfilling his side of the Tilsit agreement. He had raised the Electorate of Saxony to the status of a kingdom and had created the Kingdom of Westphalia for his brother Jerome out of Prussian territory, but the Emperor had done nothing to hasten the partition of Turkey, and Russia continued to wage her war against the Ottomans, begun in 1806, without any French aid. Moreover, the territory of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relation of Alexander's, was annexed to France without prior consultation. Russian anxieties grew still deeper when, in 1810, Napoleon not only annexed Holland in order better to enforce the Continental System, but also extended his control along the coastline stretching to the Baltic Sea. Both these actions were clear violations of Tilsit.
For his part, the Tsar had also broken his commitments. He truly closed his ports to British merchant vessels, yet British and colonial goods still came ashore via ships flying neutral flags and protected by Royal Navy escorts. The fact remained that, by 1810, the exclusion of British trade had badly hurt the Russian economy; by employing this expedient, the Tsar could improve his financial situation by collecting import duties on that goods. By the end of the year he had also increased the duty on French imports coming by land - yet another source of criticism. Alexander also grew increasingly resentful of the French satellite, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw - a Polish state reconstituted from Prussian and Austrian annexations of the partitions of the 1790s - and suspected the French of involvement in the Swedes' nomination of the former Napoleonic marshal, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (1763-1844), to their throne, as crown prince. Thus, through a combination of many factors based on mutual distrust and self-interest, the Franco-Russian alliance established in 1807 had effectively come to an end by 1811.
By this time Napoleon, grown tired of Russian rejection to support the ban on British trade, planned his ill-fated invasion, and on 24 February 1812 he enlisted Prussia's nominal support in the form of 20,000 men, improved by 60,000 Austrians supplied in conformity with a treaty concluded on 12 March. Together with his own Grande Armée of genuinely loyal troops - half of whom summoned from outside France herself - the Emperor had 600,000 men ready by the spring. The Tsar, for his part, was not idle. Apart from gathering large forces of his own, on 5 April Alexander established an offensive and defensive alliance with Sweden – finding Bernadotte in fact hostile to Napoleon – and on 28 May he ended his 6 year war with Turkey, thus releasing much needed troops for the theater of war to the north.
At the end of March, through secret proposal to Frederick William, he learned that Prussia's support for the invasion was nothing more than a demonstration, with an auxiliary corps of 20,000 men under Major-General Yorck von Wartenburg (1759-1830), while the Austrians indicated on 25 April that their army, under Prince von Schwarzenberg (1771-1820), would not take part in serious fighting. In July Russia and Britain signed a peace treaty, ending the quasi-war that Tilsit had created. For the first time since April 1805, during the formation of the Third Coalition, these two peripheral, yet powerful, nations entered into a formal alliance by which Britain promised subsidiary aid and weapons, while Russia prepared to counter the French invasion with Russia’s massive resources in manpower.
Napoleon's invasion began on 22 June, he fought a costly struggle at Borodino on 7 September and entered Moscow the same month. Weeks passed as he waited for Alexander to come to terms. Receiving no communication and with most of the city already destroyed by fire, Napoleon began the long winter retreat, with its now well-known and fatal consequences.

Previous Articles

• The fall of the French empire 1813- 1815
• French Occupation of Germany (1807-1812)

References

• Fremont-Barnes, G. (2002). Essential Histories : The Napoleonic Wars (4). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

The fall of the French empire 1813- 1815

By 1810 Napoleon had established an empire in Europe that surpassed that of Charlemagne a millennium before. Nevertheless in a couple of years it would collapse. The following articles will trace the events that led to its fall throughout the climactic years 1813-1815, in which, among a number of other battles, were fought 2 of the foremost decisive in history i.e. Waterloo and Leipzig. Leipzig, the largest battle in history till 1914, called as the 'Battle of the Nations' because of its sheer size and also the number of nationalities took part. Half a million men struggled during a clash of arms that was to determine whether Napoleon would still maintain his empire in central Europe. What might, except for the extraordinary error on the part of one sergeant of engineers, have been a drawn battle became a disaster that forced Napoleon and his crushed army to abandon Germany and withdraw across the Rhine, thus bringing the war again to French soil for the first time in more than twenty years. The campaign of 1814 which followed taxed Napoleon to the limit, and yet, with paltry forces - some mere boys – he displayed a number of his former strategic and tactical genius and cause a number of defeats on the Allies before surrender to force of numbers and the betrayal of his marshals.

Napoleon and his desperate men lead the army throughout mud and snow during the campaign of 1814 in France. In spite of the huge losses sustained by the Grande Armée the previous year Napoleon steadfastly clung to his conviction that he might ultimately achieve victory, a belief underlined by Napoleon’s apparently callous indifference to losses.’ I grew up upon the field of battle,' Napoleon declared a few months before, 'and a man such as I care little for the lives of a million men.'

The seeds of destruction were sown throughout the Russian campaign in 1812, after that, despite having lost over 500,000 men, Napoleon prepared for a new campaign in the coming spring. The Russians, encouraged by Napoleon's retreat, were prepared to carry the war that will be called as the War of the Sixth Coalition, into Germany, with Prussia as a junior partner in a new alliance.
That this alliance had been preceded by 5 others provides a good indication of the Great Powers' failure to curb French expansion since the beginning of the wars twenty years earlier. However for Prussia and for a number of other German states, this new struggle was to have an ideological element that had been missing from her 1806-1807 war: the campaign of 1813 was to become known by its patriotic title: the 'War of German Liberation'. The moral forces which had once given impetus to the armies of revolutionary France were currently coming back to haunt them, though with some adaptations. The Prussians had no desire for a republic, however their nationalism had been awakened, and therefore the war was to be for the liberation of 'Germany', more than fifty years before an actual nation state with this name emerged.
At this stage, the coalition failed to contain all the Great Powers, however unity was crucial for success. Some nations, like Sweden and Austria, wished to wait and observe how the tide of fortune moved, however eventually they and most of the former members of the Confederation of the Rhine, including Saxony and Bavaria, would side with the Allies in numbers which Napoleon might never hope to match. Britain, too, would play a significant financial and diplomatic role in the war, ensuring Allied unity and providing millions of pounds in subsidies to nations that could supply the manpower needed. Britain had committed tens of thousands of men to the ongoing struggle in Spain, and continued to man the fleets that blockaded French ports and starved Napoleon's empire of seaborne trade.
Yet Napoleon wasn't to be overwhelmed by circumstances that lesser commanders might have considered hopeless. Quickly raising new armies composed of young, inexperienced conscripts and invalided veterans, however seriously deficient in competent non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and trained officers, and with a serious shortage of cavalry, Napoleon resolved to preserve his empire in Germany, despite the rapidly spawning forces of nationalism. The Emperor's organizational genius resurrected a new army with which he achieved hard-fought victories at Bautzen and Lützen before, in late summer, Austria finally threw in her lot with the Allies, thereby making the most formidable military alliance Europe had ever seen and the combination of Great Powers that was absolutely vital if Europe was to free itself of Napoleon's control.
Further epic struggles were to follow during the autumn campaign, including the battles of Leipzig and Dresden. When operations shifted to French soil in 1814, the beleaguered Emperor found himself outnumbered by over than three to one, nevertheless in a series of brilliant actions he managed to hold the Allies at bay, displaying a military genius reminiscent of Napoleon’s earlier years. But, with Paris threatened, Napoleon’s army overwhelmed by very greater numbers, and Napoleon’s marshals refusing to fight on, Napoleon was ultimately forced to give up, only to return the following year to fight his last, and history's greatest, battle.
Waterloo was more than a battle with far-reaching political effects: it was a human drama possibly unparalleled in military history, and it is no accident that far more has been written about this 8 hours period of time than any other in history. The defense of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, the charge of the Scots Greys, Wellington's committed infantry defying the assault of the cuirassiers, the struggle for Plancenoit, and the repulse of the Imperial Guard – all became compelling and distinct episodes in a battle on which hinged nothing less than the future of European security. When it was all over, the Allies could at last implement their historic and extensive plans for the reconstruction of Europe. Though these plans didn’t guarantee peace for Europe, they offered a significant degree of stability for the next forty years. Indeed, the Vienna Settlement, in marked contrast to those before it and since - especially that achieved at Versailles in 1919 - stands as the most effective and long-lasting political settlement up to 1945.
For both senior commanders and for the ordinary ranks of Napoleon's army, campaigning had always been accompanied by a degree of hardship, mostly after nearly twenty years of constant war. However the immediate wake of the Russian campaign was to render the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 particularly hard, with march, counter-march, bivouac, hunger, thirst, rain, mud, cold, and privation. It would also be a time when commanders would be tested to the limit and the flaws in Napoleon's command structure would become clearly apparent.
In the past, field commanders had rarely been allowed to organize their operations except with the express orders of Napoleon and little was done to encourage them to develop independent thought or initiative. Without sufficient understanding of the Emperor's grand strategy or their own roles in it, Napoleon's subordinates could do little but follow orders unquestioningly at a time when armies had grown so much larger than in previous campaigns that Napoleon simply could not supervise everything, and needed commanders competent of independent decision-making. By 1813 some of these had been killed in action (Lannes, Desaix, Lasalle), others would die in the coming campaign (Poniatowski and Bessières), and still more were just tired of fighting or were busy in Spain. Some were excellent as leaders of men in combat, but were not themselves strategists and were hesitant to take independent decisions lest they fail.
With marshals continuously shifted from command of one corps to another and corps changing in composition as situation seemed to need, no practical command structure could be created. Appropriate control of increasingly poorer-quality soldiers became all the more difficult. Under such circumstances, with Napoleon unable to be everywhere and monitor everything, errors were inevitable, and at no time in his military career were these errors so obvious as in 1813-1815.

In spite of the failure in Russia, the empire remained impressive in size, consisting of an over-sized France that extended to the Rhine and across the Pyrenees, and including the Low Countries, parts of northern Italy and the Dalmatian coast. Direct Bonapartist rule extended to the Kingdoms of Italy (Napoleon himself), Naples (his brother-in-law Murat), Westphalia (his brother Jerome), and Spain (his brother Joseph). Switzerland and the Duchy of Warsaw were French satellites, alongside the various states of the Confederation of the Rhine and France possessed other allies of varying loyalty, including Denmark-Norway Prussia, and Austria, the last of which gave up its imperial princess, Marie-Louise, as Napoleon's bride in 1810. By the beginning of 1813 all this was under grave threat, with Russia, Britain, Spain, and Portugal hostile, and Prussia shortly to join them.

Next Articles

• French Occupation of Germany (1807-1812)

References

• Fremont-Barnes, G. (2002). Essential Histories : The Napoleonic Wars (4). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

French Occupation of Germany (1807-1812)

Prussia's involvement in the campaigns of 1813-15 cloud be traced back to the autumn of 1806, when, having remained faraway from the Third Coalition, Prussia foolishly confronted Napoleon with solely Saxony at their side and with the Russian armies too far to the east to help before winter. Prussia had smarted at Napoleon's creation of the Confederation of the Rhine in the heart of Germany, and the French refusal to cede Hanover (formerly a British possession) as promised, convinced King Frederick William III (1770 1840) that the time had come to put into the field his armies, widely acknowledged to be the best in Europe. The twin decisive victories at Jena and Auerstädt on 14 October destroyed the illusion of Prussia's superiority and within weeks practically all of Prussia's forces were rounded up or besieged in fortresses and obliged to capitulate.

Seeing the vaunted Prussian ranks broken at Jena and Auerstädt was quite stunning for contemporaries, however to witness the systematic hunting down of the remnants of the army and also the pitifully weak resistance given by fortresses throughout the kingdom in the following weeks was more than Prussia could accept. Years of French occupation were to follow. The Treaty of Tilsit, concluded in July 1807, imposed subordination and in its wake Napoleon took deliberate and concerted measures to diminish not only Prussia's pride and prestige, but also Prussia's military and economic power. Prussia's status as a great power was effectively vanished when Napoleon raised the status of smaller German states like Saxony, to which he allotted all Prussian territory in Prussia's former Polish province, while imposing a number of harsh restrictions on Prussia, including a massive compensation of several hundred million francs. The much respected Queen Louise (1776-1810), icon of Prussia's former grandeur and pride, had to endure numerous personal insults under French occupation, including Napoleon's description of her as 'the only real man in Prussia', and the queen's subjects attributed her premature death to such indignities. French troops occupied Prussia's fortresses on the Oder and Prussia's ports on the Baltic, while the Continental System destroyed Prussia's seaborne commerce. Large parts of Prussia's territory were let go to the French puppet government of Westphalia and Prussia's army was restricted to 42,000 men for 10 years. By all these measures and others, Prussia was left severely - but not fatally - weakened, and with Prussia's pride badly wounded Prussia would remain a potentially dangerous time-bomb in the years after Tilsit.

Meeting at Tilsit, July 1807. While France and Russia settled their differences and established an alliance which recognized Napoleonic mastery of western and central Europe, Prussia was left truncated and humiliated: a new French satellite, the Kingdom of Westphalia, absorbed all Prussian territory west of the Elbe; Prussia was stripped of her Polish possessions to create another satellite, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Danzig was created a free city; Prussia was forced to join the Continental System; and, finally, French troops were to remain on her soil until enormous war indemnities were paid in full.

The result was a movement of reform and growing patriotism, some of it exposed for all to see, though much of it kept secret so as to prevent French detection and suppression. Young Prussians established the anti-French Tugendbunde ('League of Virtue'), and other societies which encouraged not simply a narrow form of Prussian patriotism, but a kind of pan-German unity that demanded freedom from foreign domination in general, but especially French. At official levels reforms were carried out by men like Baron Stein (1757-1831), who worked in a civilian capacity, Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) and Augustus von Gneisenau (1760-1831), who introduced radical and new changes in the army. Though aware of many of these activities, Napoleon did not fear Prussian attempts at social, economic and military reform, because he believed Frederick William to be too hesitant to oppose French might. In any event, Prussia had neither the financial nor the military resources to wage a war of national resistance.
For five years the Prussians suffered under Napoleonic occupation, their desire for vengeance and passionate hatred of the French growing more intense as the years passed. These sentiments, whether overtly simply pro-German or anti-French, had been promoted and fostered by the philosophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Johann Fichte (1762-1814). Before long, Prussians began to channel their dissatisfaction into thoughts of patriotism, embracing notions hitherto connected with the French Revolution, especially the concepts of 'nation' and, in a peculiarly German form, 'fatherland'. Unlike the French, however, the Prussians did not regard such revolutionary principles as entirely contradict with monarchy.

Queen Louise of Prussia. Revered by her subjects as the soul of national virtue, Louise openly advocated war with France in 1806 and regularly referred to Napoleon as 'the Monster'. On taking up the challenge, the Emperor announced in his Bulletin to the army' A beautiful queen wants to see a battle. So, let us be gallant and march at once .. .The two did not come face to face until the historic meeting at Tilsit in July 1807, by which time Prussia had been comprehensively beaten and occupied,

Wholesale military reforms were introduced along with social reforms, which in turn encouraged a growing sense of German nationalism between 1807 and 1813. In Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation, delivered in the winter of 1807-08 but which provided a model for many others to follow, Fichte defied the French occupiers with a less than subtle appeal for resistance to Napoleonic rule:

It is only by means of the common characteristic of being German that we can avert the downfall of our nation, which is threatened by its fusion with foreign peoples, and win back again an individuality that is self-supporting and quite incapable of any dependence on others ...we alone must help ourselves if help is to come to us ...By means of the new[system of ] education we want to mould the Germans into a corporate body ... The German, if only he makes use of all his advantages, can always be superior to the foreigner ...he alone is capable of real and rational love for his nation.

These ideas had an effect on civilians, not only among young intellectuals but also the nation as a whole, and also profoundly affected the officer corps, including men like Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who would later accomplished even greater prominence with his magnum opus, Vom Kriege ('On War'). Not only did Prussian soldiers adopt the battle cry 'Das Vaterland!' in place of 'Der König!', but they were retrained to employ entirely new tactics and methods introduced by specially organized commissions that scrapped the obsolete system employed by the armies of Frederick the Great (1713-86). These were replaced with drills, organization, tactics, and technology, based on careful studies of Napoleonic innovation. The reformers stop corporal punishment, just like in the French Revolution, as unworthy of men fighting for the 'nation' or 'fatherland', so that a soldier might follow his officers out of respect rather than fear. Just as in French revolutionary reforms, merit overcame aristocratic privilege as the principal criterion by which eager young men committed to national service acquired a commission and subsequent promotion.

Augustus Wilhelm, Count von Gneisenau. A general in the Prussian Army, Gneisenau worked with Scharnhorst in implementing wide-ranging military reforms between 1807 and 1813, including new principles for officer training, the establishment of a general staff, and the introduction of a system of reservists, by which large

numbers of men could be trained, released back into civilian life and then called up on short notice to swell the ranks of the army He performed well as Bluchers Chief of Staff from 1813 to 1815

The Prussian Army had been strictly limited to 42,000 men by Napoleonic dictat. Prussian military reformers now employed an ingenious method of circumventing this restriction, enabling them to train more soldiers without exceeding the official size of the army. A system of shrinkage (Krümpersystem) was introduced by which men called to the colors received intensive training, and joined the ranks for a limited time before being released back to civilian life. These recruits would later be recalled for further periods of training to maintain a reasonable level of fitness and acquaintance with military life, but once demobilized they became a sort of hidden reserve, which by the beginning of 1813 amounted to 80,000 men - in addition to the standing army. Therefore, as the spring campaign season opened, Prussia was reasonably ready - with Russia taking a leading role - to challenge Napoleonic authority, for spiritual and military preparations had been under way for five years. It was clear, moreover, that the winter retreat had inflicted a devastating blow to French arms, and the sight of the shattered remains of the Grande Armée shuffling on to Prussian territory encouraged those who were already inclined to resist the occupation.

Emperor Francis I of Austria. Under Francis Austria was a consistent opponent of both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, fielding armies in numerous unsuccessful campaigns (1792-97, 1800, 1805, 1809) which reduced the vast Habsburg territories in Italy, Poland, and along the Adriatic coastline. After first seeking to appease Napoleon by offering his daughter; Marie- Louise, in marriage, Francis ultimately threw in his lot with the Allies in August 1813, and accompanied his army until the fall of Paris.

Resistance emerged elsewhere in Germany during this period. While Austria again opposed France in 1809, Napoleon subdued Austria once more, taking Vienna in May, suffering a temporary check at Aspern- Essling, and finally emerging victorious at Wagram on 5 July. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn (14 October), Emperor Francis I (1768-1835) ceded land to the Confederation of the Rhine, to Saxony, and to the Kingdom of Italy. Russia, by then in possession of Swedish Finland, received part of Austria's Polish territories in Galicia. Francis, playing for time in which to recover and reorganize both his army and his shattered finances, offered Napoleon - now divorced from the Empress Josephine (1763-1814) - the hand in marriage of his daughter, the Archduchess Marie-Louise (1791-1847), and the two produced a son, Napoleon II (1811-32), born on 20 April 1811, and known as the 'King of Rome'.
Hereafter, signs of growing German resistance became particularly marked. Not only had Austria risen up, but many individual Germans began to question the legitimacy of French domination of central European affairs. Already in 1806 the French had executed a bookseller from Nuremberg named Johann Palm (1768-1806) for printing and distributing anti-French literature. In 1809 a young Thuringian, bent on assassinating Napoleon and in so doing accelerating the French withdrawal from Germany, was executed. And in the following year Andreas Hofer (1767-1810), who had raised the standard of revolt in the Tyrol just prior to the campaign of 1809, was also executed. The French had also demanded that the Prussian government arrest and hand over their foreign minister, Stein, for alleged conspiracies against France, and only Stein's refuge in Russia prevented a lengthy prison term and possibly death. Such heavy-handed policies against German patriots, accused of treason while merely questioning the French presence in their midst, began to effect a profound change in German attitudes.

Previous Articles

•  The fall of the French empire 1813- 1815

Next Articles

• Franco-Russian relations (1805-1812)

References

Fremont-Barnes, G. (2002). Essential Histories : The Napoleonic Wars (4). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Charles Nungesser (French Ace)

A much bemedalled Charles Nungesser is seen wearing both French and foreign decorations, including the British Military Cross (via Norman Franks)

 Charles Eugene Jules Marie Nungesser was born in Paris on 15 March 1892. Dropping out of school, he travelled to Brazil to work in his uncle's sugar plantation, but ended up finding employment in Argentina as a car mechanic. He then started racing cars professionally in South America at the age of 17, where he met another Frenchman who had access to an aeroplane. Nungesser talked his friend into letting him take the Bleriot into the air by himself, and after flying it around for a few minutes, he made a successful landing. Within two weeks he had refined his flying abilities and started his career in aviation.

Returning to France following the outbreak of war, Nungesser joined the 2nd Hussars as a private. He requested, and was approved for, a transfer to the Service Aeronautique at around this time. Receiving his brevet on 2 March 1915, Nungesser was sent to VB106, then moved to N65, having achieved one victory in a Voisin two-seater. However, soon after arriving at his new unit he took off without permission, so although he received the Croix de Guerre, he was also placed under close arrest for eight days! Gaining his second victory in December, Nungesser became a Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur. Badly injured in a crash on 6 February 1916, which saw both of his legs broken, he returned to be commissioned, and in April began scoring victories. Wounded in combat on 19 May, he was back in action within a few days. By the end of 1916 Nungesser had claimed 21 victories, but had been injured again in June. He had also received the Military Cross from the British. In early 1917 Nungesser had to return to hospital because of his earlier injuries, but he managed to persuade his superiors not to ground him. Getting himself attached to V116, with his own Nieuport, he added nine more confirmed victories to his tally by August 1917.

In December Nungesser was injured yet again, this time in a car crash, but after treatment, and a month as an instructor, the ace returned to his old unit - now SPA65. Although the rest of the escadrille now flew SPADs, he still continued with later versions of the Nieuport adorned with his distinctive fuselage insignia of a black heart, as well as large red, white and blue stripes on the wings and top decking. In May 1918, with his score at 35, Nungesser was made an Officer of the Legion d'Honneur. By mid August he had claimed a total of 43 victories, plus 11 probables. Post-war, Nungesser flew many crowd-pulling aerial shows, and then came the chance to fly the Atlantic with old friend Francois Coli. The pair took off on 8. May 1927 in a Levasseur PL 8 but were never seen again. At one stage it was said he had had every major bone in his body broken at least once, and he often flew before previous injuries had properly healed.

Nieuport 17bis N1895 of Lt Charles Nungesser, V116, May 1917
While almost all of Nungesser's aircraft carried the famous black heart, with skull and crossbones and coffin and candlesticks, on the fuselage sides, he also had broad red, white and blue bands applied across the uppersurfaces of all wings and on the fuselage top decking. A number of French Nieuports carried these because the wing configuration of the aircraft was often confused with the Albatros Scout.

Werner Voss (German Ace)

The great ace Werner Voss watches an aircraft being demonstrated alongside legendary fighting scout designer Anthony Fokker. Voss, with his 'Blue Max' worn around his neck, would soon claim his final kills in an early pre-production example of Fokker's famous triplane scout

Werner Voss was born in Krefeld on 13 April 1887. When he was 27, he enlisted in his local militia, then went to war with the 2. Westfälische Husaren Regiment Nr 11 - a unit known as the 'dancing hussars'. Like so many other cavalrymen, the stalemate of trench warfare failed to meet his expectations, and he transferred into aviation in August 1915. Once trained, Voss was assigned to Kasta 20 of Kagohl IV, and he began his career as a pilot in the Verdun area. He was happily transferred to Jasta Boelcke on 21 November 1916, and opened his account with two victories six days later.

Voss scored rapidly in February and March 1917, and on the 17th of the latter month he received the Knight's Cross with Swords of the Royal Hohenzollern House Order (the 'Hohenzollern'). With his tally at 24, he received the 'Blue Max' on 8 April. This was followed by routine leave, during which Voss missed most of the killing time of 'Bloody April'. In May 1917 he returned to Jasta Boelcke and brought his score to 28 (12 of them being hapless BE 2s), but the young fighter ace - he had just turned 20 - was dissatisfied with his Staffelführer, the veteran Hauptmann Franz Walz. Along with another misguided young pilot, Werner Voss submitted charges to his superiors that Walz was 'war-weary', and that an elite unit like Jasta Boelcke required a more dynamic leader. Their blatant disregard for the military code of conduct and the chain of command saw both pilots posted out of the prestigious Jasta. Voss received a severe, but private, reprimand, his youth and record saving him from harsher punishment.

Voss was given acting command of Jasta 5 on 20 May, then a scant nine days later he moved to Jasta 29. His time as Staffelführer only lasted five days, whereupon he went to command Jasta 14. Voss seems to have cared little for the responsibilities of command, and despised paperwork. At the end of July 1917 his old comrade Manfred von Richthofen called upon him to take command of Jasta 10, and Voss was soon building up the score of this previously lacklustre unit. Issued with one of the first Fokker FI triplanes to reach the front in early September 1917, Voss saw considerable action in the machine up until his death in action in the storied clash with seven SE 5as of the crack No 56 Sqn on 23 September 1917. Aged just 20, Voss had been credited with 48 victories prior to his death.

Albatros D III of Leutnant Werner Voss, Jasta 2 Boelcke and Jasta 5, mid-1917
Werner Voss, during his period with Jasta Boelcke, flew this much-decorated Albatros D III. When interviewed by historian Alex Imrie (circa 1960), Voss' motor mechanic Karl Timm recalled that the ace instructed him and Flieger Christian Rüser (the airframe mechanic) to paint a red heart with white border on both sides of the fuselage, and there are photos of Voss himself touching up the white border. Then Voss had them add a white swastika (merely a good luck symbol at this time). Timm told Voss he thought this looked a bit bare, and suggested that he add a laurel wreath around the swastika, which the pilot agreed to. Voss continued to fly this D III in these markings at Jasta 5, but it almost certainly did not follow him to Jasta 10.

Roderic S Dallas (Australian Ace)

Born on 30 June 1891 in Mount Stanley, Queensland, Stan Dallas joined the Australian Army in 1913 and received a commission several months later. Following the outbreak of World War 1 in August 1914, he applied for a transfer to the RFC in the UK but was rejected. Unperturbed, Dallas then approached the Royal Navy, and was appropriately accepted by the RNAS. Starting flying training in June 1915, he had his wings by November and joined 1 Naval Wing in Dunkirk on 3 December. Piloting two-seaters and single-seat Nieuport 11 Bébé scouts on reconnaissance patrols over the North Sea, often in terrible weather, Dallas' flying abilities quickly developed to the point where he claimed his first three combat victories in April and May 1916 flying the diminutive French Bébé.

Sub-Lt Dallas officially achieved 'acedom' in the prototype Sopwith Triplane N500 on 9 July 1916 when he sent a Fokker E III down 'out of control' over Mariakerke. By February 1917 his score stood at seven, he had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and he was now a flight commander in the newly-established 1 Naval Squadron (formerly 1 Naval Wing). With the unit now fully equipped with Triplane, it was sent to the Somme front in April to help hard-pressed RFC squadrons deal with the Fokker 'scourge'. Dallas made the most of this opportunity by claiming eight victories between 5 and 30 April, followed by two more in May.

Given command of 'Naval 1' on 14 June, with his official score then standing at 17 victories, Dallas had boosted his tally to 23 by the time he left the unit in March 1918 - having flown Camels during his final eight months with 'Naval V, Dallas became a SE 5a pilot when he was made CO of the RAF's No 40 Sqn in early April.

On 1 June 1918, with his overall score having reached 32 (some sources claim that it could be as high as 56), Dallas took off alone on a mid-morning patrol over the front line. Flying west of the Allied trenches, he was attacked out of the clouds by a trio of Fokker Dr I triplanes from Jasta 14. Australia's second-ranking ace was fatally wounded when shots fired by Staffelführer Leutnant Johannes Werner hit the cockpit of his SE 5a, and he crashed to his death near Lievin - Dallas was Werner's sixth of seven victims.

Triplane N5436 C of Sub-Lt Roderic Dallas, 1 Naval Squadron, La Bellevue, France, April 1917
Australian ace Roderic Stanley Dallas of 'Naval 1' flew this aircraft between December 1916 and May 1917, during which time he used it to claim 11 victories. Future ace C B Ridley then flew the veteran fighter in August and September 1917, scoring a further two victories with it. Very much a 'plain Jane' Triplane, it had a metal cowling and a clear-doped fin and wheel covers